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2647 
MERGER SETTLEMENT AND ENFORCEMENT 
POLICY FOR OPTIMAL DETERRENCE AND 
MAXIMUM WELFARE 
Steven C. Salop* 
 
Merger enforcement today relies on settlements more than litigation to 
resolve anticompetitive concerns.  The impact of settlement policy on 
welfare and the proper goals of settlement policy are highly controversial.  
Some argue that gun-shy agencies settle for too little, while others argue 
that agencies use their power to delay to extract overreaching settlement 
terms, even when mergers are not welfare reducing.  This Article uses 
decision theory to throw light on this controversy.  The goal of this Article 
is to formulate and analyze agency merger enforcement and settlement 
commitment policies in the face of imperfect information, litigation costs, 
and delay risks by the merging parties, agencies, and the courts.  The 
Article explains why limiting the goal of merger enforcement and agency 
settlement policy simply to avoid welfare harms, but nothing more, is 
flawed as a matter of both law and policy and would compromise 
deterrence.  The decision-theoretic analysis distinguishes two types of 
agency commitment policies:  a short-run optimal policy that focuses only 
the specific merger proposal being evaluated and a long-run optimal policy 
that takes into account effects on future mergers and deterrence goals.  The 
short-run optimal policy may lead to some welfare-reducing settlements by 
a rationally gun-shy agency; settlement demands for weakly welfare-
enhancing merger proposals, what might be called “exacting tribute”; and 
“anti-deterrence” effects by merging firms proposing some mergers with 
greater welfare harm in order to increase settlement bargaining leverage.  
In contrast, a disciplined long-run optimal policy would clear all welfare-
enhancing mergers as proposed; forgo negative welfare settlements despite 
the risk of losing in court, but instead demand settlements on welfare-
reducing merger proposals sufficient to lead to strict welfare increases (not 
just welfare neutrality), relative to no merger; and avoid anti-deterrence by 
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demanding larger settlements for more harmful mergers.  While these latter 
provisions might be controversial as a political matter, they support 
deterrence.  Demanding only welfare-neutral settlements would lead to 
under-deterrence.  Deterrence also would be improved if last-minute 
voluntary divestiture agreements were not treated as part of the merger 
agreement evaluated by the court, contrary to the approach taken in Arch 
Coal and other cases. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Mergers are the central focus of civil antitrust enforcement by 
governmental antitrust agencies.  Almost all proposed mergers in the United 
States are cleared as proposed.  For example, fewer than 3 percent of the 
mergers that were reported under the Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust 
Improvements Act (HSR) process in 1999–2011 in the United States 
received second requests, and about 30 percent of these are cleared as 
proposed.  Most of the rest were settled by consent decree or voluntary 
restructuring.  Some are abandoned by the parties in response to agency 
settlement demands or threats of litigation.  Only a few were litigated in 
court.  As noted in Table 1, fewer than 2 percent of mergers that received 
second requests reached an adjudicated judgment.  
Because of the low percentage of adjudicated cases, merger enforcement 
has been characterized as a regulatory system, rather than law 
enforcement.1  Of course, this is an overstatement.  Most law enforcement 
systems involve plea bargaining with few cases actually going to trial.2  A 
high settlement rate is not surprising in light of the cost and uncertainty of 
litigation.  Merger settlements do not simply have the goals of economizing 
on litigation costs, achieving certainty, and preventing delays.  Settlements 
should also serve two overarching policy goals:  (i) preventing specific 
mergers from lessening competition, while preserving welfare benefits; and 
(ii) deterring future anticompetitive mergers.  Achieving these twin 
enforcement goals in an efficient way requires careful analysis. 
Achieving these goals is complicated by the fact that merger analysis 
involves inherent uncertainty.3  Agency competitive-effects analysis 
typically occurs before the merger is consummated in a fairly short period 
of time on the basis of limited information.  If the agency predicts that the 
merger likely will reduce welfare, it must defend its prediction to a judge 
who generally is not an antitrust expert.  This means that agency settlement 
demands and settlement negotiations are tightly connected to litigation; a 
breakdown in the negotiations is the precursor to trial.  Settlement demands 
also must take into account the potential for errors by the agencies and the 
courts. 
 
 1. See, e.g., A. Douglas Melamed, Antitrust:  The New Regulation, 10 ANTITRUST 13, 
13 (1995); see also Spencer W. Waller, Prosecution by Regulation:  The Changing Nature of 
Antitrust Enforcement, 77 OR. L. REV. 1383, 1385–86 (1998); Michael L. Weiner, Antitrust 
and the Rise of the Regulatory Consent Decree, 10 ANTITRUST 4 (1995).  
 2. See George Priest & Benjamin Klein, The Selection of Disputes for Litigation, 
13 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 54 (1984). 
 3. Jonathan B. Baker & Carl Shapiro, Evaluating Merger Enforcement During the 
Obama Administration, 65 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 28 (2012), http://www.stanford
lawreview.org/merger-enforcement-obama-administration; Ken Heyer, A World of 
Uncertainty:  Economics and the Globalization of Antitrust, 72 ANTITRUST L.J. 375, 375 
(2005); Michael L. Katz & Howard A. Shelanski, Merger Analysis and the Treatment of 
Uncertainty:  Should We Expect Better?, 74 ANTITRUST L.J. 537, 538 (2007).  
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This means that a key merger policy issue is the appropriate settlement 
demand.4  The current posture of the agencies has generated great 
controversy.  Some argue that the agencies are overreaching in their 
settlement demands, while others argue that the agencies are gun-shy and 
too readily accept welfare-reducing settlements in order to avoid the risk of 
litigation.  For example, Joe Sims and Michael McFalls conclude that the 
agency settlement regime has led to bureaucratic overreaching that harms 
consumers and the merging parties.5  They suggest that the government has 
the upper hand in settlement negotiations because of its power to delay the 
resolution of the merger.  According to Sims and McFalls, agencies use this 
delay power to demand excessive divestitures, what might be characterized 
as “extracting tribute.”  To prevent this harmful overaggressiveness, Sims 
and McFalls suggest that the agencies instead should adopt a policy based 
on what they call the “principle of minimal intrusion,” that is, the minimal 
divestiture necessary to prevent welfare harm, relative to the no-merger 
outcome.6  Thomas Barnett, the Department of Justice’s Assistant Attorney 
General during the second George W. Bush Administration, expresses a 
similar goal.7 
In contrast, Lawrence Frankel concludes that the design of the 
enforcement system leads to systematic underenforcement and excessive 
false negatives.8  According to Frankel, the agencies have weaker 
bargaining leverage caused by informational disadvantages, the need to 
carry the burden of proof in court—where decisions are reviewed by 
generalist judges—and a fear of losing in court.  He notes that the agencies 
settle for divestitures that leave consumers worse off.9 
 
 4. For an overview of settlement policy, see Robert Pitofsky, Chairman, FTC, The 
Nature and Limits of Restructuring in Merger Review, Remarks at Cutting Edge Antitrust 
Conference (Feb. 17, 2000), available at http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/pitofsky/restruct.htm.  
For a discussion of achieving effective divestitures, see William J. Baer & Ronald C. 
Redcay, Solving Competition Problems in Merger Control:  The Requirements for an 
Effective Divestiture Remedy, 69 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 915, 915 (2001). 
 5. Joe Sims & Michael McFalls, Negotiated Merger Remedies:  How Well Do They 
Solve Competition Problems, 69 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 932, 938 (2001); see also Melamed, 
supra note 1, at 13; Joe Sims & Deborah P. Herman, The Effect of Twenty Years of Hart-
Scott-Rodino on Merger Practice:  A Case Study in the Law of Unintended Consequences 
Applied to Antitrust Legislation, 65 ANTITRUST L.J. 865, 899 (1997). 
 6. Sims & McFalls, supra note 5, at 933. 
 7. Thomas O. Barnett, Current Issues in Merger Enforcement:  Thoughts on Theory, 
Litigation Practice, and Retrospectives, Remarks at the Lewis Bernstein Memorial Lecture 
(June 26, 2008), available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/speeches/234537.htm (“We 
don’t propose more than is needed—we don’t attempt to create bargaining chips.  We simply 
propose the remedy we believe is appropriate.”). 
 8. Lawrence M. Frankel, The Flawed Institutional Design of U.S. Merger Review:  
Stacking the Deck Against Enforcement, 2008 UTAH L. REV. 159, 190.  
 9. On the basis of a number of retrospective studies, Weinberg concludes that there has 
been underenforcement. Matthew Weinberg, The Price Effect of Horizontal Mergers, 
4 J. COMP. L. & ECON. 433, 434 (2008).  For a similar view, see Heyer, supra note 3, at 
383. 
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The goal of this Article is to analyze these issues through a decision-
theoretic lens.  It focuses on the role of imperfect information and litigation 
costs in driving optimal enforcement and settlement policy.10  This Article 
does not analyze the form or structure of the remedy.11  Instead, it focuses 
on the appropriate aggressiveness of agency settlement and enforcement 
strategy.  This Article assumes that the goal of merger policy is to 
maximize expected welfare.12 
This analysis involves a number of related questions:  Should the 
agencies ever offer or accept settlements, rather than adopting a “just say 
no” stance to anticompetitive mergers and litigating them all, while clearing 
all procompetitive mergers as proposed?  Assuming that settlements are 
made, how strong a settlement should the agencies demand?  Should the 
agencies refuse any settlement that involves a reduction in welfare, relative 
to the no-merger level, even if they face a risk of losing in court?  Should 
the agencies ever demand settlements that lead to a level of welfare strictly 
 
 10. These issues have been studied by a number of other economists, beginning with 
Stigler’s seminal work on the impact of U.S. enforcement on the number and composition of 
mergers. See George Stigler, The Economic Effects of the Antitrust Laws, 9 J.L. & ECON. 225 
(1966); see also Robin Aaronson, Do Companies Take Any Notice of Competition policy?, 2 
CONSUMER POL’Y REV. 140 (1992); Jo Seldeslachts et al., Settle for Now but Block for 
Tomorrow:  The Deterrence Effects of Merger Policy Tools, 52 J.L. & ECON. 607, 607 
(2009). 
 11. Most recently, there has been consideration of when (if at all) the agencies should 
use behavioral remedies instead of divestitures or other structural remedies. See DOJ & FTC, 
HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES (Aug. 19, 2010) [hereinafter HORIZONTAL MERGER 
GUIDELINES], available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2010/08/100819hmg.pdf.  For a recent 
interesting commentary, see Ken Heyer, Optimal Remedies for Anticompetitive Mergers, 26 
ANTITRUST 26 (2012). 
 12. Elsewhere I have concluded that the relevant antitrust standard is true consumer 
welfare. See Steven C. Salop, Question:  What is the Real and Proper Antitrust Welfare 
Standard? Answer:  The True Consumer Welfare Standard, 22 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 336, 
336 (2010).  However, the analysis of settlements in this Article also would apply to other 
economic welfare standards.  The key assumption I am making is that merger settlements 
will fall in the range where the settlement will increase welfare and decrease profits.  For 
further discussion of the proper welfare measure, see Robert H. Lande, Chicago’s False 
Foundation:  Wealth Transfers (Not Just Efficiency) Should Guide Antitrust, 58 ANTITRUST 
L.J. 631 (1989).  For a defense of the total welfare standard, see Ken Heyer, Welfare 
Standards and Merger Analysis:  Why Not the Best?, 2 COMPETITION POL’Y INT’L 29, 29 
(2006).  Note also the economics literature that shows that agencies with an overarching goal 
of maximizing aggregate welfare nonetheless might commit to use a consumer welfare 
standard in merger enforcement when negotiating with the merging parties.  These models 
also discuss merger policy and deterrence more generally. See Mark Armstrong & John 
Vickers, A Model of Delegated Project Choice, 78 ECONOMETRICA 213 (2010); David Besanko & 
Daniel F. Spulber, Contested Mergers and Equilibrium Antitrust Policy, 9 J.L. ECON. ORG. 1, 
1 (1993); Joseph Farrell, Negotiation and Merger Remedies:  Some Problems, in 
MERGER REMEDIES IN AMERICAN AND EUROPEAN UNION COMPETITION POLICY 95 (Howard 
Shelanski & Francois Leveque eds., 2003); Joseph Farrell & Michael L. Katz, The 
Economics of Welfare Standards in Antitrust, 2 COMPETITION POL’Y INT’L 2 (2006); 
Sven-Olof Fridolfsson, A Consumer Surplus Defense in Merger Control, in THE 
POLITICAL ECONOMY OF ANTITRUST 287 (V. Ghosal & J. Stennek eds., 2007); Damien J. 
Neven & Lars-Hendrik Röller, Consumer Surplus vs. Welfare Standard in a 
Political Economy Model of Merger Control , 23 INT’L J. INDUS. ORG. 829 (2005). 
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above the no-merger level?  Should the agencies negotiate settlements or 
just make nonnegotiable, take-it-or-leave-it settlement demands?  Should 
the agencies accept eleventh hour voluntary divestiture offers? 
This Article uses decision theory to formulate “optimal” agency 
settlement policy under two alternative assumptions.  It first formulates a 
“short run” optimal policy that focuses only the specific merger proposal 
being evaluated and does not take deterrence into account.  It then 
formulates a superior “long run” optimal policy that takes into account 
effects on future mergers and deterrence goals.13  It also evaluates the 
competing claims about agency behavior in the context of the optimal 
policies. 
The analysis reaches a number of conclusions.  The optimal short-run 
and long-run policies are very different.  The short-run optimal policy may 
lead to some welfare-reducing settlements by a rationally gun-shy agency.  
It also may involve exacting tribute by settlement demands for weak 
welfare-enhancing merger proposals.  It also may cause unintended “anti-
deterrence,” whereby some merging firms propose mergers with greater 
potential welfare harm in order to increase their settlement bargaining 
leverage.  In contrast, a disciplined long-run optimal policy would clear all 
welfare-enhancing mergers as proposed.  It also would forgo negative 
welfare settlements despite the risk of losing in court, but instead demand 
settlements on welfare-reducing merger proposals sufficient to lead to 
overall welfare increases (not just welfare neutrality), relative to no merger.  
While demanding such welfare-enhancing settlements for harmful mergers 
might be politically controversial, it serves the fundamental deterrence 
goals of antitrust.  Demanding only welfare-neutral settlements would lead 
to under-deterrence.  Anti-deterrence would be avoided by demanding 
larger settlements for more harmful mergers.  Deterrence also would be 
improved if last-minute voluntary divestiture agreements were not treated 
as part of the merger agreement evaluated by the court, contrary to the 
approach taken in Arch Coal and other cases. 
The remainder of this Article is organized as follows.  Part I sets out the 
basic analytic framework and the formal model used.  To fix the ideas, Part 
II explains that the proper standard for merger enforcement is welfare 
maximization, subject to the constraints imposed by practicality and 
deterrence.  Part III analyzes the agency’s short-run optimal settlement 
commitment strategy when there are nontrivial litigation costs for the firm 
and imperfect information provided by the agency, parties, and the court.  
Part IV analyzes the properties of the optimal long-run deterrence strategy.  
The conclusion discusses several possible extensions of this analysis. The 
Appendix contains a technical model of the basic issues and the short run 
optimal policy. 
 
 13. Long-run optimization also could take into account the impact on legal standards and 
future judicial decisions. 
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I.  BASIC ANALYTIC FRAMEWORK 
This Article uses decision theory to formulate optimal merger 
enforcement and settlement policy under the HSR process in the United 
States and the analogous regulatory process in other countries.  It analyzes 
two types of agency settlement and enforcement strategies:  (i) a short-run 
optimal policy, which assumes that the agency evaluates each merger 
proposal on its own, without regard to any possible impact of its decision 
on future merger proposals, and (ii) a long-run optimal policy, which 
assumes that the agency does take into account the impact of its decisions 
on future merger proposals.  The long-run optimal policy differs 
substantially from the short-run policy.  By including long-run deterrence 
effects into its analysis, the long-run policy better protects consumer 
welfare.  It also resolves a number of the commentators’ criticisms of 
current agency policy. 
This analysis involves an understanding of the incentives of the agencies 
and the merging parties to settle cases rather than litigate.  The analysis of 
settlement incentives involves an understanding of the costs and benefits of 
litigation versus settlement for the agencies and the merging parties.  These 
depend, in turn, on the impact of the transaction on welfare and 
profitability, as well as on imperfect information and litigation costs.  They 
also depend on expectations of the outcome in court, including the fact that 
the courts also suffer from imperfect information.  Design of optimal long-
run enforcement policy also involves an understanding of how the agencies’ 
settlement demands and settlement negotiations affect deterrence, that is, 
how they affect future merger proposals.  Because settlements are 
negotiated in the shadow of the law, it also is necessary to link settlement 
behavior to the legal standards and to the behavior of courts.14 
A.  The Importance of Settlements in Merger Enforcement 
It is clear that settlement is a key aspect of the merger review and 
enforcement process.  Settlements permit mergers to proceed expeditiously 
and achieve cognizable efficiencies, while reducing or eliminating market 
power concerns.15  In fact, most mergers that raise competitive concerns 
settle, rather than go to court.  Table 1 provides basic merger U.S. 
enforcement outcomes data for 1999–2011.16  Fewer than 2 percent of 
mergers that received second requests reached an adjudicated judgment.   
 
 14. See Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law:  
The Case of Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950, 950 (1979). 
 15. See Heyer, supra note 12. 
 16. For similar statistics, see Frankel, supra note 8, at 162–63 (2008), and the references 
cited therein. See also Jonathan B. Baker & Carl Shapiro, Reinvigorating Horizontal Merger 
Enforcement, in HOW THE CHICAGO SCHOOL OVERSHOT THE MARK 235, 244 (Robert Pitofsky 
ed., 2008); Baker & Shapiro, supra note 3, at 28; Jonathan B. Baker & Carl Shapiro, 
Reinvigorated Merger Enforcement in the Obama Administration, ANTITRUST & 
COMPETITION POL’Y BLOG (June 25, 2012), http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/
antitrustprof_blog/2012/06/reinvigorated-merger-enforcement-in-the-obama-
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Of course, these results likely would have been different if the agency 
settlement policy and behavior were different.  Thus, understanding 
settlement behavior and formulating sensible policy is a key component of 
merger enforcement policy.  This Article is a step in that direction. 
 
Table 1:  Outcomes of HSR Filings17 
 
Year Reported  Second Requests  Challenged
Challenges18 
Restructure Abandoned Consent Decrees  
Adjudicated 
Cases Won at 
judgment 
Adjudicated 
Cases Lost at 
judgment 
201119 1,414 58 36 13 total 19 2 2 
2010 1,128 46 35 4 7 24 0 0 
2009 684 31 29 2 12 15 0 0 
2008 1,656 41 35 5 3 26 1 0 
2007 2,108 63 32 7 7 16 0 2 
2006 1,746 45 30 6 9 15 0 0 
2005 1,610 50 17 2 4 11 0 0 
2004 1,377 35 24 1 5 15 0 2 
2003 968 35 33 3 17 13 0 0 
2002 1,142 49 31 5 12 13 0 1 
200120 2,237 70 55 20 8 26 1 0 
2000 4,749 98 79 16 26 36 1 0 
1999 4,340 111 76 16 23 37 0 0 
Total 25,159 732 512 94 139 266 5 7 
% of total 
filings 100.0% 2.9%       
% of Second 
Requests  100.0% 70.0% 12.8% 19.0% 36.3% 0.7% 1.0% 
 
administration.html; Daniel A. Crane, Has the Obama Justice Department Reinvigorated 
Antitrust Enforcement?, 65 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 13, 16 (July 18, 2012), http://www.
stanfordlawreview.org/online/obama-antitrust-enforcement. 
 17. Table does not include non-HSR challenges. 
 18. The difference between Restructuring and Consent Decrees is whether the complaint 
was filed.  Restructuring indicates altering the transaction without the government filing a 
formal complaint, while a consent decree entails settlement occurring after either the 
commencement of litigation or agency proceedings. 
 19. For 2011, the FTC stated that its seventeen challenges have resulted in nine consent 
decrees, three judicial proceedings (FTC v. Phoebe Putney Health Sys., Inc., 133 S. Ct. 1003 
(2013) (pending following reversal and remand); FTC v. Promedica Health System, Inc., No. 
3:11 CV 47, 2011 WL 1219281 (N.D. Ohio Mar. 29, 2011) (win); FTC v. Lab. Corp. of 
Am., No. 11-55293 (9th Cir. Mar. 14, 2011) (loss)), and five abandon/restructures.  The five 
abandon/restructure cases are nonpublic and cannot be categorized any further.  The 
Commission’s counterpart, the DOJ, entered into eleven consent decrees, one merger was 
abandoned (United States v. AT&T, No. 11-01560 (D.D.C. filed Aug. 31, 2011)), one 
merger was blocked at trial (United States. v. H&R Block, Inc., No. 11-00948 (D.D.C. Oct. 
31, 2011)), and seven other transactions were restructured.  For purposes of calculating the 
percentages, all five FTC cases were allocated to the abandoned column based on the FTC’s 
statistical average from the 1999–2010 period of having an abandon-to-restructure ratio of 
eighty-three to five. 
 20. In February 2001, the HSR reporting rules changed, resulting in a substantial 
reduction in the number of mergers that required HSR filings. Pub. L. No. 106-553, § 630, 
114 Stat. 2762 (2000). 
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B.  Imperfect Information, Litigation Costs, and Delay 
Merger review takes place in an environment of inherent uncertainty and 
litigation costs.  Settlements are struck through negotiation, in which 
bargaining leverage is important.  The key to understanding the bargaining 
leverage of the two sides involves several factors:  the impact of the merger 
on welfare and profitability, the relative litigation and delay costs of the two 
sides, their information and risk aversion, their reputational costs and 
benefits of litigation, and the behavior of the courts.21 
The impact of the consummation of the transaction on welfare and 
profitability clearly is a paramount factor.  The agencies are tasked with 
protecting competition and maximizing welfare.  The merging firms are 
concerned with maximizing shareholder value.  Another key factor is 
relative litigation costs.  For the merging firms, delay costs and uncertainty 
are likely more significant than out-of-pocket litigation costs, except 
perhaps for small transactions.22  Delays raise costs for several reasons.23  
First, litigation delays the consummation of the transaction and 
achievement of the increased value.  Second, delays lead to uncertainty that 
obviously makes it risky for the merging firms to move forward with their 
business plans and strategies during the interim until the matter is resolved. 
This may not be primarily an issue of risk aversion but rather a matter of 
not wanting to waste investments.  In addition, delays can lead to the loss of 
key managers of the acquired firm, who do not know if they will be retained 
after the merger. 
Finally, and perhaps most important, delays increase the likelihood that 
the merger will fail to be consummated at all, even aside from the legal 
risks.  It is commonly said that “time is the enemy of the deal” and the 
situation is no different for merger transactions.  During the period of delay, 
market conditions and strategies may change, so that the merger may no 
longer be in the interest of one of the parties or might create the potential 
for opportunism.  Because delays put the entire value of the transaction at 
risk, they provide strong incentives to settle quickly. 
If the merging firms’ litigation and delay costs are large, the agency 
would gain a significant bargaining advantage.  It could anticipate that its 
settlement demand is more likely to be accepted by the merging firms to 
 
 21. For a dealmaker’s view of negotiation dynamics, see JAMES C. FREUND, SMART 
NEGOTIATING:  HOW TO MAKE GOOD DEALS IN THE REAL WORLD (1993); see also ROGER 
FISHER & WILLIAM URY, GETTING TO YES:  NEGOTIATING AGREEMENT WITHOUT GIVING IN 
99 (1981).  The economic analysis of bargaining is based on the Nash bargaining solution 
and Nash sequential bargaining equilibrium. See John Nash, The Bargaining Problem, 18 
ECONOMETRICA 155 (1950); see also Ken Binmore et al., The Nash Bargaining Solution in 
Economic Modeling, 17 RAND J. ECON. 176 (1986). 
 22. For large matters, out-of-pocket costs probably will be small relative to the 
incremental value of the merger.  That incremental value is equal to the net present value of 
future profits less the cost of the acquisition. 
 23. The magnitude of these delay costs is more likely to be a proportion of the 
incremental value of the merger, rather than being a fixed cost that does not vary with the 
size of the transaction. 
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avoid further delays.24  This anticipation might lead the agency to demand a 
more intrusive settlement. 
The agencies also may have litigation costs.  First, the agencies have 
limited budgets, which could create opportunity costs.  However, it is not 
clear how significant these opportunity costs are.  Budgets are sufficient for 
litigation on the current scale and likely would be increased if litigation 
intensity increased over time.  The agencies also may have negative 
opportunity costs in that litigation experience provides valuable staff 
training and beneficial credentials.  However, the agencies likely do face 
significant capacity constraints during limited periods of merger booms or 
when an administration wants to quickly ramp up litigation intensity.25 
The agencies are also sensitive to their win-loss records in court.  The 
agencies appear concerned that critics will interpret losses in court as 
agency overreaching, bad judgment, or incompetence.  The agencies also 
may want to avoid losses to maintain staff morale.  There also could be 
possible adverse deterrence effects from losses in court.  A loss in court 
could change the law and thereby alter the agency’s future litigation 
prospects.  All of these factors create “opportunity costs” for the agencies 
that could make them “gun shy” about bringing cases instead of reaching a 
settlement, even if the settlement leads to a welfare reduction.26  As 
discussed below, these concerns arguably are overstated, if not entirely 
unfounded.27 
C.  The Determinants of Settlement Behavior 
Imperfect information is central to this analysis.  We assume that all three 
participants (the agency, the firms, and the court) face imperfect 
information about welfare.  We assume that the agency can accurately 
estimate the expected welfare impact, in the sense of having unbiased 
estimates.  However, those estimates involve some unavoidable uncertainty 
regarding the ultimate actual welfare impact.  For example, even if the 
 
 24. Sims & McFalls, supra note 5, at 938 (focusing on the agency’s ability to inflict 
delay costs on the firm as the primary reason for the agency’s bargaining leverage). 
 25. For example, as noted in Table 1, comparing the merger wave of 2000 to the more 
modest merger activity in 2011, the second request rate was about 2 percent in 2000 versus 4 
percent in 2011.  There also were more transactions adjudicated in 2011.  
 26. For example, the DOJ’s loss in the Oracle merger litigation has been said to have led 
to its scaling back its enforcement of unilateral effects. See Baker & Shapiro, supra note 3, at 
32–33; James A. Keyte, United States v. H&R Block:  The DOJ Invokes Brown Shoe To 
Shed the Oracle Albatross, 26 ANTITRUST 32, 32 (2012) (“[T]he desire for a litigated win in 
the shadow of Oracle had become palpable in the hallways of the Antitrust Division.”); Scott 
A. Sher & Andrea Agathoklis Murino, Unilateral Effects in Technology Markets:  Oracle, 
H&R Block, and What It All Means, 26 ANTITRUST 46, 46 (2012) (“[T]he DOJ’s recent 
victory in H&R Block has reinvigorated a mode of unilateral effects analysis that had been 
seriously undermined when the DOJ lost the Oracle case.” (citations omitted)). 
 27. See infra Part IV.B. 
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estimate of expected welfare impact is positive, it is possible that the 
merger actually could cause welfare to fall, or vice versa.28 
In the United States, the enforcement agencies do not have carte blanche 
to order divestitures or other changes to the structure of the merger.  
Instead, settlements are negotiated in the shadow of the legal standards for 
liability under section 7 of the Clayton Act.29  A court will reject a proposed 
merger if and only if it concludes that the expectation is that the merger will 
be welfare reducing, relative to the no-merger alternative.30 
We assume that the court has no information that the agency lacks.31  For 
simplicity, we also assume that the parties and the agency agree about the 
welfare impact of the settlement.32  We assume that the court is generally 
less informed and less expert than the agency.  We thus will assume for 
simplicity that the court has made an erroneous finding (false acquittal), if 
and when it rules against an agency that challenges a merger that the agency 
believes will reduce welfare.33  While this assumption clearly is not always 
true, and is also not essential for the conclusions drawn, it serves as a useful 
abstraction to simplify the analysis.  However, we will assume that the 
court’s decisions are not perverse.  That is, we assume that the court is less 
likely to falsely convict if the welfare benefits are larger, and the court is 
less likely to falsely acquit if the welfare harms are larger. 
In order to estimate the likelihood that its settlement demand will be 
accepted by the merging firms, the agency must estimate the firms’ 
incremental profitability of the merger and their litigation and delay costs, 
including delay risks.  The firms would have the incentive to accept a 
settlement demand that would lead to profits that exceed their expected 
profits from litigating.  If the agency had perfect information about 
 
 28. For example, the agency may expect that the merger either will reduce welfare by 
100 or raise it by 40, each with probability of 50 percent, in which case the expected welfare 
impact is a welfare reduction of 30 (i.e., 50% x (-100) + 50% x (+40) = -30). 
 29. 15 U.S.C. § 18 (2006). 
 30. This raises the issue of whether a court should evaluate the merger relative to an 
attainable maximum welfare standard rather than a no-merger alternative, as discussed in 
more detail below in Part II.B.  
 31. In the real world, additional information sometimes is developed in preparation for 
trial that would change the estimate of the expected welfare.  This possibility is ignored in 
the analysis here, but could be added. 
 32. In the real world, the merging firms likely face imperfect information about the 
agency’s estimate of the incremental welfare impact of the merger as proposed, as well as 
the agency’s estimate of the welfare impact of various alternative structures that might be 
offered as settlements.  This imperfect information might involve the agency’s analysis of 
the cognizability of the claimed efficiencies, as well as market power factors.  The firms also 
might have imperfect information about the agency’s opportunity costs.   
 33. See, e.g., Frankel, supra note 8, at 174; Sims & Herman, supra note 5, at 898 
(“[T]here is no doubt that those at the agencies are more skilled at understanding and 
applying complicated economic concepts than the average federal judge or clerk.”).  For 
an opposing view, see Joshua D. Wright & Angela M. Diveley, Do Expert Agencies 
Outperform Generalist Judges? Some Preliminary Evidence from the Federal Trade 
Commission, 1 J. ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT 1 (2012).  However, this Article uses the 
decision to appeal as the measure of the likelihood of error.  This test assumes that appeals 
courts are a more reliable arbiter of the correct outcome. 
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profitability, it could tailor a maximal settlement demand that the merging 
firms surely would accept.  In this way, the agency could also avoid 
transactions being abandoned as a result of overreaching settlement 
demands, as well as avoid unnecessary litigation.  However, we assume that 
the agency generally has imperfect information about the firms’ 
profitability, including their perceived cost and risk of delay. 
For much of our analysis, we assume that the agency makes a 
nonnegotiable, “take it or leave it” (TIOLI) settlement demand, backed up 
by a commitment to litigate if its demand is rejected by the firms.34  We 
assume that these demands are made after the agency has reached its 
conclusion about the welfare impact of the merger, based on its own 
completed investigation, analysis by the parties, and discussions between 
the agency and the parties. 
Bargaining theory often assumes that negotiators are not able to make 
credible TIOLI offers.  However, in the case of merger enforcement, the 
agency has inherent bargaining advantages that make reputation formation 
and commitments more possible.  Enforcement decisions are made 
repeatedly by the agencies with respect to numerous mergers and those 
decisions are accompanied by explanations.35  The agencies also can 
reinforce their reputational effects and make their threats more credible 
through guidelines, press releases, and speeches. 
This assumption that the agency makes nonnegotiable settlement 
demands clearly does not describe current agency behavior.  The normal 
procedure is for the agency and merging parties to negotiate over the details 
of a possible settlement, not simply to make threats.  Negotiations are used 
to exchange relevant information about the potential agreement, explore 
common ground, and learn the consequences of failure to reach 
agreement.36  These informational benefits may mitigate or even trump the 
bargaining power benefits to the agency of committing to making only a 
single nonnegotiable offer.  However, the assumption that the agency 
makes nonnegotiable settlement demands is a useful starting point for our 
normative analysis of optimal enforcement policy. 
 
 34. Of course, firms have potential bargaining counterstrategies to mitigate or even 
reverse the agency’s inherent bargaining leverage.  One strategy is a last-minute divestiture 
proposal, as discussed in Part IV.E.  Firms also can signal a greater (and more credible) 
willingness to litigate in various ways—such as by agreeing to a duty to litigate or a large 
reverse breakup fee in the acquisition agreement—by preparing their trial strategy and 
exhibits in advance or by retaining a law firm with a reputation and taste for litigating.  For 
an interesting database on reverse termination fees, see Dale Collins, Antitrust Reverse 
Termination Fees, ANTITRUST UNPACKED (July 15, 2011), http://www.antitrustunpacked
.com/siteFiles/BlogPosts/005_reverse_breakup_fees1.pdf. 
 35. A few merging parties are repeat players and they have a similar ability to establish 
reputations. 
 36. See, e.g., FISHER & URY, supra note 21, at 67, 80; FREUND, supra note 21, at 37.  
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II.  THE WELFARE-MAXIMIZATION STANDARD AND OPTIMAL DETERRENCE 
To explicate these concepts, we initially assume that there are no 
information imperfections or litigation costs.  We assume instead that the 
agency and the merging parties both know (and agree on) the welfare 
impact and profitability of the merger and possible settlements.  We also 
assume that the court never errs.  Within this simple structure, we analyze 
the agency’s settlement commitment strategy and the impact of the strategy 
on the behavior of merging firms.  This simple scenario also can be used to 
explain the benefits of a settlement standard geared toward maximum 
welfare, not welfare neutrality. 
The overarching goal of the antitrust laws is to maximize welfare.  We 
consider how this goal should play out for an agency choosing its 
settlement policy for potentially anticompetitive mergers.  We assume that 
the agency makes a nonnegotiable settlement demand.  If the firms reject 
the settlement demand, the matter goes to litigation, and the court decides 
whether or not to block the merger based on the incremental welfare impact 
of the merger as proposed.  Because the court also has perfect information, 
it enjoins the merger if and only if the merger reduces welfare.  That is, the 
court uses a legal standard of welfare neutrality. 
A.  The Agency’s Welfare-Maximizing Optimal Settlement Demand 
Suppose that there is perfect information and zero litigation costs for all 
sides.  In this scenario, the agency’s optimal strategy is simple.  If the 
merger as proposed is welfare enhancing, the agency will clear the merger 
as proposed.  If the matter were litigated in court, the judge would correctly 
find that the merger is welfare enhancing and would reject the agency’s 
complaint with certainty.  Firms know this fact, so any settlement demand 
would be rejected by the firms, which lack litigation and delay costs. 
In contrast, if the merger were welfare reducing, the agency would have 
complete control.  The court would enjoin the merger with certainty if the 
matter were litigated.  In this situation, the merging firms would accept any 
settlement demand for which its incremental profits would remain positive.  
Thus, the agency would have the ability and incentive to make the 
settlement demand that maximizes welfare, subject only to the constraint 
that the firms would rather accept the settlement than abandon the 
transaction. 
B.  The Proper Welfare Benchmark for Merger Enforcement 
This ability and incentive of agencies to demand the welfare-maximizing 
divestiture raises the policy issue of whether maximum welfare should be 
the agency’s goal in settlements.  The liability standard is that a merger is 
illegal where “the effect of such acquisition may be substantially to lessen 
competition.”37  It might be argued that this implies that the agency should 
 
 37. 15 U.S.C. § 18 (2006). 
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limit settlement demands solely to prevent the mergers from reducing 
welfare and should not demand settlements that lead to strictly positive 
incremental welfare impacts, let alone welfare maximization.38 
This argument for welfare neutrality misses the mark for several reasons.  
First, the section 7 legal standard applies to judicial decision making, not to 
settlements.  Settlements are voluntary agreements that are made to avoid 
litigation and are not subject to the same standard as for liability.39  In fact, 
as discussed below, when there is imperfect information and agency 
litigation costs, the agency often will find it optimal to accept some 
settlements that lead to welfare reductions to compensate for litigation 
risks.40 
Second, even as a legal matter, the relevant standard is not welfare 
neutrality of the overall merger as proposed.  The issue is more 
complicated.  The proper standard is welfare maximization, subject to 
constraints of practicality and deterrence.  Firms would not be incentivized 
to opt for the most efficient and procompetitive merger proposals if the 
competitive-effects analysis were judged solely on the overall impact of the 
merger proposal as a whole.  Their incentives predictably would lead to 
lower welfare and might be called “anti-deterrence.”41  Thus, agencies and 
courts should analyze whether multiple aspects of the merger are 
inextricably linked and reasonably necessary to achieve the welfare goals of 
the transaction.  If they are not inextricably linked, they should be evaluated 
separately. This procedure is consistent with a standard of welfare 
maximization, not welfare neutrality. 
This policy analysis can be illustrated by the example of a firm that 
carries out a series of acquisitions over time.  For example, suppose that one 
supermarket chain in Los Angeles first proposes to acquire one of the two 
Los Angeles supermarket chains owned by a significant competitor.  
Suppose that this acquisition of the one chain would be considered clearly 
procompetitive and welfare enhancing and would be cleared by the agency.  
Suppose, however, that the buyer subsequently proposes to acquire the 
seller’s second chain three months later.  Suppose that the agency concludes 
that this second merger clearly would be anticompetitive and welfare 
reducing.  Thus, the agency would challenge this second merger.  These 
results are not controversial. 
As a benchmark for comparison, consider the following alternative 
timing.  Suppose instead that the buyer had proposed to acquire both chains 
simultaneously.  Assume further that the agency concludes after its analysis 
 
 38. See Sims & McFalls, supra note 5, at 938. 
 39. For example, see Joseph G. Krauss et al., The Tunney Act:  A House Still Standing, 
ANTITRUST SOURCE (June 2007), http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publishing/
antitrust_source/Jun07_Krauss6_20f.authcheckdam.pdf.  For a critical view, see John J. 
Flynn & Darren Bush, The Misuse and Abuse of the Tunney Act:  The Adverse Consequences 
of the “Microsoft Fallacies, 34 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 749 (2003).  
 40. See supra Part II. 
 41. Anti-deterrence is discussed in more detail in Part III. 
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that both acquisitions considered jointly (on an all-or-nothing basis) would 
raise welfare but that the welfare enhancement actually comes solely from 
the acquisition of the first chain.  That is, the acquisition of the second 
chain reduces welfare (as in the first example) by less than the acquisition 
of the first chain raises welfare.  If the two acquisitions were inextricably 
linked in some way, it would make sense to analyze the acquisitions as a 
single unit.  But, in the hypothetical example, suppose that the agency 
concludes that the welfare benefits from the first acquisition are not 
inextricably linked to the second acquisition.  That is, suppose that the 
agency further concludes that, if the two acquisitions had been attempted 
sequentially, the second acquisition would have been challenged as 
anticompetitive, just as in the previous scenario. 
In this hypothetical, the agency should not permit the acquisition of the 
second chain.42  The merger-specific efficiencies are not inextricably linked 
to the acquisition of the second chain.  This merger (absent the divestiture) 
could also be considered a violation of section 7.  The acquisition of the 
smaller chain has the effect of substantially lessening competition.43 
These examples show that if competitive effects are evaluated solely on 
the overall impact, it could incentivize merging firms to broaden their 
procompetitive merger proposals to include anticompetitive elements.  This 
might involve expanding the set of assets acquired.  It also might involve 
including (or even adding) anticompetitive provisions.  This is a harmful 
incentive that predictably would lead to lower welfare.  Thus, if merger law 
is concerned at all with deterrence, it must condemn this conduct.  This 
implies that the legal standard is welfare maximization, not simply welfare 
neutrality of the overall merger proposal.  Only if the multiple elements of 
the merger are inextricably linked, as explained in the Merger Guidelines, 
should they be evaluated as unitary.44 
This focus on welfare maximization does have two important limits.  
This analysis does not give the agencies carte blanche to engage in subtle 
restructuring of procompetitive mergers in order to gain small increases in 
welfare.  First, a small welfare enhancing divestiture may not be practical.  
A small divestiture might not raise welfare while a large divestiture may 
lead to litigation in a world with imperfect information.  Second, as 
discussed below, a policy of exacting tribute from mergers that are welfare 
enhancing as proposed actually may reduce deterrence by lessening the 
incentives of merging firms to forgo welfare-reducing proposals in favor of 
welfare-enhancing ones.  Thus, it would not be long-run optimal.45 
 
 42. Or, if the seller insisted on selling both chains, the agency should require the 
divestiture of the second chain. 
 43. This analysis easily can be placed into the context of section 1.  The acquisition of 
the second chain’s assets (and the resulting incremental reduction in welfare) is not 
reasonably necessary for the success of the merger as a whole. 
 44. HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 11, at 30.  
 45. See supra Part IV.B. 
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C.  Merger Selection, Restructuring, and Deterrence Effects 
The analysis of the short-run optimal policy assumes that the agency and 
the merging firms take the structure of the proposed merger as fixed.  The 
merging firms respond to the agency’s settlement demand by settling, 
litigating, or abandoning the transaction.  However, in the real world, the 
firms might voluntarily restructure the merger even before proposing it to 
the agency.  Restructuring can benefit the firms by altering the agency’s 
demand. 
Such restructuring incentives are straightforward to analyze when there is 
perfect information and de minimis litigation and delay costs, and when the 
agency demands the welfare-maximizing settlement for all welfare-
reducing mergers while clearing as proposed welfare-neutral and welfare-
enhancing mergers.  Suppose that an acquiring firm is contemplating a 
welfare-reducing merger proposal.  Anticipating the agency’s settlement 
demand, it would be in the interest of the firm voluntarily to restructure the 
merger proposal to the welfare-neutral level.  Although this structure would 
reduce its profits relative to the original merger as proposed, it likely would 
lead to higher profits than if the agency forced the firms to make the 
welfare-maximizing divestiture.  The same result could occur if the 
acquiring firm has a choice to select one of several potential merger 
partners. 
Although the agency in this example is following a short-run policy 
without regard to deterrence, its policy nonetheless has a deterrent effect.46  
Deterrence is an important goal of merger enforcement.  Agency settlement 
policy must treat deterrence as a central goal. 
III.  IMPERFECT INFORMATION, LITIGATION COSTS, AND THE AGENCY’S 
SHORT-RUN OPTIMAL SETTLEMENT COMMITMENT STRATEGY 
Agency settlement behavior depends on whether the agency focuses 
solely on the merger under consideration or whether it takes deterrence 
effects into account.  This part analyzes the optimal policy when deterrence 
is not the focus.  The analysis of this short-run optimal policy is complex 
when the parties have imperfect information and significant litigation costs.  
The predicted results resemble the outcomes discussed—and criticized—by 
commentators. 
A.  Basic Analytics 
The analysis can be explained most simply by distinguishing among 
mergers that have different welfare impacts as proposed.  Much of the 
analysis in this section is based on the technical model contained in the 
Appendix. 
 
 46. On closer analysis, however, the voluntary restructuring ironically is harmful to 
welfare.  As a result of this voluntary restructuring, the agency then loses the opportunity to 
force the firm to settle for the welfare-maximizing structure. 
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1.  Welfare-Reducing Mergers 
Consider a merger that is expected to be welfare reducing as proposed.  
The agency would choose the settlement demand that optimally balances 
the risks and rewards of being more or less aggressive.  On the one hand, 
the reward for being more aggressive is that welfare will be higher, if the 
settlement demand is accepted.  On the other hand, the risk is that the 
merging firms are less likely to accept a tougher demand.  And, if the firms 
reject the demand, the agency may lose in court, in which case consumers 
will suffer the welfare reduction from the merger as proposed.   
For this reason, it may be optimal for the agency to propose a settlement 
that nonetheless would lead to welfare harm, even if the agency litigation 
costs are zero.  The explanation for this striking result is the agency’s fear 
of the court reaching a false-acquittal result and permitting the merger as 
proposed.  In deciding whether to accommodate a welfare-reducing 
settlement, the agency would recognize that a false acquittal would lead to 
even greater welfare harm than would an accommodative settlement. 
This analysis also shows how a greater potential for judicial errors affects 
settlements.  The larger the probability of a false acquittal, the more likely 
the agency would have the incentive to weaken its settlement demand.  
Indeed, even if the likelihood of a false negative falls far short of 50 
percent, the agency might still be so fearful that the firms would reject the 
settlement and the agency would lose in court that it will accept a 
significantly welfare-reducing settlement.47 
In fact, a merger with larger welfare harm as proposed sometimes can 
lead the agency to demand an even weaker welfare-reducing settlement.  
This can occur if the likelihood of a false acquittal for the more harmful 
merger proposal nonetheless remains significant.  In particular, when the 
expected harm from a merger as proposed is higher (that is, when the 
decrease in the likelihood that the firms would win in court is more than 
offset by a larger potential welfare harm from the more problematic 
merger), then the agency has more to lose from going to court.  This is a 
very significant result because it suggests that firms may do better by 
proposing more problematic mergers, what might be called “anti-
deterrence.” 
There are limits to this effect.  One might expect that the likelihood of a 
false acquittal would become very low for egregiously anticompetitive 
mergers, leading to a lower expected welfare harm.  But, while this might 
be true in the extreme, the agency cannot simply assume that the probability 
of a false negative approaches zero, even for substantially anticompetitive 
transactions.  The defense could win on a procedural technicality; the 
 
 47. The agency also would be more willing to be satisfied with a negative welfare 
settlement when a welfare-neutral settlement demand would lead to a substantial reduction in 
the likelihood that the firms would accept the settlement.  In that situation, it might make 
sense for the agency to settle for a smaller welfare reduction, rather than take on the 
litigation risk of a false-acquittal outcome. 
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agency’s lawyers may be outgunned in court by a well-financed and skillful 
adversary; the agency’s key witness might blow up on the stand; or, perhaps 
an inexperienced, careless, or ideologically blinded district court judge will 
totally miss out on the merits.48 
In contrast, there are two situations where an agency focused only on the 
short-run clearly would find it optimal to insist on a welfare-enhancing 
settlement.  One situation is a case in which both the agency and the firms 
perceive that the agency’s chances of winning in court are very high.  In 
that situation, the firms would likely be willing to agree to a welfare-
enhancing settlement and the agency would have the incentive to take the 
(small) risk that the firms would choose to litigate.  The other situation 
involves an agency expectation that the risk-reward ratio is low, that is, 
where the agency perceives that a more aggressive settlement demand 
would not significantly reduce the firms’ willingness to settle.  In that case, 
the more aggressive settlement demand would have only a very small 
downside risk.  As a result, it would make sense for the agency to push the 
envelope. 
2.  Welfare-Neutral and Welfare-Enhancing Mergers 
Consider next a welfare-neutral merger proposal.  Putting aside agency 
litigation costs, it always would be short-run optimal for the agency to 
demand a welfare-improving settlement rather than clear the merger as 
proposed.  The firms would almost surely accept a modest settlement.  But, 
even if there is some chance that a more aggressive demand would lead to 
litigation and potential loss in court, the agency would lose nothing. 
Consider next a merger that is expected to be welfare enhancing as 
proposed.  The agency nonetheless may demand a settlement that would 
increase welfare, rather than permit the merger as proposed.  The merger as 
proposed does not maximize welfare, so there is room for a welfare 
improvement by a more aggressive stance.49  As long as the firms have 
some fear of losing in court or some litigation or delay costs, they would 
have the incentive to make some concessions.  This situation illustrates a 
bargaining advantage that the agency has in settlement negotiations. 
The agency’s short-run optimal settlement demand would be simple if it 
knew the firms’ profit function and litigation and delay costs.  The agency 
could demand the maximum settlement offer that the firm would accept.  
However, with imperfect information, demanding a more aggressive 
 
 48. For example, in FTC v. Whole Foods Market Inc., the judge apparently overlooked 
statements by the CEO that one effect of the merger would be to eliminate the possibility of 
future price wars. See FTC v. Whole Foods Mkt., Inc., 502 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2007), 
rev’d, 548 F.3d 1028, 1041 (D.C. Cir. 2008).  In Lundbeck, the judge made an inexplicable 
market definition error. See FTC v. Lundbeck, Inc., 2010-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) ¶ 77,160 (D. 
Minn. 2010), aff’d, 650 F.3d 1236 (8th Cir. 2011). 
 49. This assumes, of course, that the efficiencies would not be lost.  Where the 
efficiencies are inextricably linked to the divested assets, consumer welfare benefits could be 
lost. 
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settlement is a risky and somewhat ironic agency strategy.  On the one 
hand, if the firms accept the settlement, welfare will improve.  On the other 
hand, if the firms reject the settlement and the agency wins in court (as a 
result of a false acquittal), welfare will be lower than if the merger were 
cleared as proposed.  Thus, if the merging firms reject the settlement 
demand, the agency actually may have the short-run incentive to abandon 
the litigation.50 
For this reason, when the agency decides to demand a settlement for a 
welfare-enhancing merger as proposed, it must do so judiciously.  First, the 
agency should only take this aggressive approach when the merger as 
proposed is not substantially better than welfare neutral.  In that situation, 
the agency has less to lose if the firms reject the settlement and the agency 
wins in court.  Second, the agency should reserve such an aggressive 
strategy for situations where the firms’ litigation and delay costs appear 
high.  In that way, the probability is lower that the settlement will be 
rejected.  Third, the agency should not be greedy.  It should not demand 
such a large divestiture that it becomes unlikely that the firms will accept 
the settlement. 
There are several economic reasons why such an aggressive policy might 
not be short-run optimal for the agency, even if the agency ignores 
deterrence effects.  First, the agency may be less intent on extracting small 
settlements because such settlements may not actually increase welfare.  
For example, a divestiture that does not include an entire business may be 
too small to create a viable business entity.51  Second, the agencies 
conceivably may feel that extracting such tribute is irresponsible behavior 
that involves the abuse of governmental power. Or, perhaps staff morale 
would be reduced by litigating such cases.  Third, the agencies may fear 
that the firms will litigate out of anger, despite the cost of doing so.52  
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, extracting tribute is not long-run 
optimal.  It can be an impediment to effective deterrence, as discussed 
below in Part IV. 
 
 50. One possible option would be for the agency to assign its less talented litigators to 
the case as a way to reduce its likelihood of winning in court.  Of course, given the 
importance of the agency maintaining its commitments in order to incentivize future firms to 
accept such settlements, abandoning the suit or throwing the game would not be a wise move 
in the long term. 
 51. See FTC, BUREAU OF COMPETITION, A STUDY OF THE COMMISSION’S DIVESTITURE 
PROCESS 4 (1999), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/1999/08/divestiture.pdf. 
 52. Although this is an explanation grounded in practical reality and behavioral 
economics, rather than purely rational decision making, it is common for bargaining to go 
awry when one side appears unreasonable. FREUND, supra note 21, at 80.  This is a common 
result in the Ultimatum Game. See Ernst Fehr & Simon Gächter, Cooperation and 
Punishment in Public Goods Experiments, 90 AM. ECON. REV. 980, 984–93 (2000); Richard 
H. Thaler, Anomalies:  The Ultimatum Game, 2 J. ECON. PERSPECTIVES 195, 196–203 
(1988).  
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B.  The Role of Judicial Error 
A higher likelihood of judicial errors will impact the agency’s optimal 
settlement demand.  If the likelihood of false acquittals is higher, the 
agency must be more accommodating in its settlement demands in welfare-
reducing mergers.  This is an unsurprising result.  Perhaps more 
surprisingly, if the likelihood of false convictions is higher, the agency also 
should be less aggressive in its settlement demands in welfare-enhancing 
mergers.  This is an implication of the result that welfare is higher when the 
agency loses a welfare-enhancing litigated case than when it wins. 
C.  Deterrence Impacts 
As discussed earlier in the case of perfect information, there are 
deterrence effects even if the agency does not design its policies with 
deterrence in mind.  The deterrence effects can involve the selection of a 
merger partner or the proposed structure of the merger.  These results also 
occur when there is imperfect information and litigation costs.  These 
deterrence effects can be counterintuitive. 
1.  Beneficial Deterrence 
Consider a welfare-reducing merger proposal.  It might be in the 
acquiring firm’s interest to choose a less problematic merger partner or 
restructure the terms of the merger in a more accommodative way before 
being confronted by the agency.53  Even if the agency does not demand a 
strict welfare-enhancing proposal, a somewhat less harmful structure could 
increase the likelihood of a false acquittal.  This higher probability of a false 
acquittal would increase the incentives of the firm to reject an aggressive 
settlement demand and raise agency concerns about losing in court.  Both 
effects would serve to deter the agency from making a more aggressive 
settlement demand.  As a result, the firms may end up with higher profits.  
This deterrence is beneficial in the sense that the proposed structure is less 
welfare reducing.54 
2.  Anti-deterrence 
With imperfect information and litigation costs, the result could reduce 
deterrence or create “anti-deterrence.”  That is, the firms may find it more 
profitable to propose a more problematic merger or structure their merger in 
 
 53. Restructuring might be done as part of a prepackaged voluntary divestiture or 
through other agreements made at the time of the initial HSR filing.  Or, it might be 
formulated during the investigation process.  As long as a court will evaluate the impact of a 
restructured transaction, not the original structure, this type of restructuring would place the 
firms in a better position to resist aggressive settlement demands by the agency.   
 54. Of course, the existence of deterrence effects does not mean that there is optimal 
deterrence.  Optimal deterrence would require additional information about the distribution 
of potential mergers.  Analyzing this issue is beyond the scope of this Article.  The required 
data also would be difficult to collect. 
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a more welfare-reducing way in an attempt to frighten the agency into 
accepting a weaker settlement. 
 Normally, a larger welfare-reducing merger proposal would decrease 
the likelihood of a false acquittal and would thereby embolden the agency 
to demand an even stronger settlement.  But, where there is a significant 
likelihood of a false acquittal that is not highly affected by the merger 
structure, the opposite result can occur.  The fear of a larger welfare 
reduction, in the event that the settlement is rejected and the court falsely 
acquits, will serve to “up the ante” for the agency and may lead it to 
propose a weaker settlement.  As a result, the profits of the merging firms 
may rise.55 
Merging firms would never say publicly that they are taking a more 
aggressive approach to create an in terrorem effect on the agencies.  But 
this type of conduct sometimes appears to occur.  More importantly, this 
result suggests the importance of the agency designing a long-run optimal 
merger settlement policy that takes deterrence effects into account. 
IV.  LONG-RUN OPTIMAL POLICIES FOR EFFECTIVE DETERRENCE 
Deterrence of anticompetitive conduct is an important goal of antitrust 
law and merger enforcement.  Courts and commentators often phrase this 
issue in terms of minimizing the frequency and cost of “false positives” and 
“false negatives.” These terms are sometimes treated as if they solely 
involve erroneous convictions and acquittals made by courts, given the 
legal standard.  But, the terms also implicate deterrence in the setting of 
legal standards.56  Instead, a better interpretation of the term “false 
positives” would include “over-deterrence.” 
The previous analysis of the short-run optimal policy assumed that the 
agency determined its settlement demand for each merger on its own, 
without reference to the impact of its decisions on future mergers.  Those 
decisions nonetheless would have beneficial or adverse deterrence effects.  
A long-term optimal strategy would attempt to deter anticompetitive 
mergers while encouraging procompetitive ones, as well as interdicting 
 
 55. For example, suppose that the court may erroneously define the market so broadly 
that the combined market share of the merging firms will be in the safe harbor with or 
without a divestiture.  The Merger Guidelines contain a provision that if the HHI is 
sufficiently low, the merger normally will be cleared without further analysis, a provision 
that is commonly referred to as a “safe harbor.”  See, e.g., Carl Shapiro, The 2010 Horizontal 
Merger Guidelines: From Hedgehog to Fox in Forty Years, 77 ANTITRUST L.J. 701, 721 n.76 
(2010). 
 56. See, e.g., Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Serv. Corp., 465 U.S. 752, 763 (1984) 
(“[D]eter or penalize perfectly legitimate conduct.”); see also Monsanto Elec. Indus. Co. v 
Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 594 (1986) (“[C]hill the very conduct the antitrust laws 
are designed to protect.”).  Indeed, if the sole goal in setting a legal standard were to 
minimize errors, without any regard to deterrence effects, one optimal standard would be per 
se illegality backed up by huge sanctions.  With that standard, no one would ever violate the 
law, so there would be no trials and, therefore, no erroneous convictions or acquittals. 
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anticompetitive merger proposals and permitting procompetitive ones to 
proceed. 
Formulating a settlement policy to achieve optimal deterrence is not a 
trivial undertaking when the parties have imperfect information and 
litigation costs.57  However, further analysis can describe some of the key 
principles of such a policy.  The analysis also suggests several useful rules 
of thumb. 
A. Tailoring Settlement Demands To Increase Deterrence 
Deterrence functions by impacting the incentives of the merging firms.  
The general way to achieve deterrence is to formulate a policy that leads 
firms to have higher expected returns from welfare-enhancing merger 
proposals than for welfare-reducing proposals.  The agencies have two 
basic policy instruments:  issuing complaints and demanding settlements.58  
Issuing complaints is a costly approach, and it is imperfect in light of the 
judicial false-acquittal problem. 
The agencies can use settlement demands to improve deterrence.59  This 
would involve demanding aggressive settlements for welfare-reducing 
merger proposals while clearing welfare-enhancing mergers.  This policy 
would increase the benefits at the margin to the firms making more 
procompetitive merger proposals.  Thus, the firms’ incentives to propose or 
restructure welfare-reducing mergers would be increased. 
This result follows from the basic economics of optimal deterrence.  
Suppose that the incidence of false convictions and false acquittals means 
that the likelihood of being convicted and penalized does not increase very 
much when an individual actually violates the legal standard, compared to 
 
 57. Building a formal optimal control model to derive the optimal long-run settlement 
policy for a distribution of merger proposals and firm restructuring decisions in response to 
the policy is beyond the scope of this Article.  Instead, this Article will discuss several rules 
of thumb for approaching optimality.  There is economic literature involving formal models 
of merger enforcement policy for optimal deterrence.  For example, the recent article by 
Nocke and Whinston concludes that for all but the smallest acquirer, the agency only should 
approve mergers that increase welfare surplus by an amount that exceeds a strictly positive 
minimal acceptable level. See Volker Nocke & Michael. D. Whinston, Merger Policy with 
Merger Choice, (Northwestern Univ., Searle Ctr. Legal & Regulatory Studies, Working 
Paper, 2010), available at http://www.law.northwestern.edu/searlecenter/papers/Nocke
Whinston_MergerChoic.pdf.  In contrast, their earlier article concludes that dynamic 
optimality is achieved if the agency follows a simple myopic merger policy of approving all 
mergers that increase consumer welfare. See Volker Nocke & Michael. D. Whinston, 
Dynamic Merger Review (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 14526, 
2008), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1312621.  These 
models do not include either settlements or litigation risk. 
 58. The agency could achieve more deterrence if it had the ability to directly levy high 
fees on welfare-reducing mergers.  However, the only way it can “tax” is to issue complaints 
or demand settlements. 
 59. For the purposes of this Article, I assume that the optimal strategy is to make 
nonnegotiable settlement demands.  There are certain benefits to adopting a negotiation 
strategy instead, as noted elsewhere.  Subsequent work can examine this assumption in more 
detail. 
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when the individual actually satisfies the standard.  In this scenario, the 
incentives to satisfy the standard are reduced, relative to the case in which 
there are no errors.60  The analysis is somewhat more complicated when the 
individual can control behavior at the margin with (marginally) more or less 
“aggressive” behavior (i.e., choosing whether or not to step closer to or just 
over the line separating legal from illegal behavior).  If the choice of 
behavior at the margin does not have much effect on the probability and 
likelihood of being detected and convicted or on the resulting expected 
sanction, there is less incentive to stay within the legal line, which would 
lead to under-deterrence.61 
The likelihood of false acquittals in this analysis complicates the optimal 
policy because it weakens the relationship between the behavior and the 
likelihood of being penalized.  However, this weakening effect can be 
mitigated by increasing penalties.  For example, this is one role of treble 
damages in antitrust.62 
This deterrence analysis can also be applied to settlements.  While the 
exact shape of the optimal settlement and enforcement policy is impossible 
to describe algebraically, and would depend on the underlying distribution 
of merger proposals and effects, this analysis suggests three simple rules of 
thumb to improve deterrence.  By following these three rules, the agencies 
would give merging firms an increased incentive to propose welfare-
enhancing mergers and restructure welfare-reducing mergers voluntarily.  
 
 60. See Richard A. Posner, An Economic Approach to the Law of Evidence, 51 STAN. L. 
REV. 1477, 1484 (1999).  For a simple technical example, see Henrik Lando, Does Wrongful 
Conviction Lower Deterrence?, 35 J. LEGAL STUD. 327, 329–30 (2006).  Lando’s example 
assumes that the probability of a false acquittal is Pa, the probability of a false conviction is 
Pc and the sanction is a fine of F.  In that case, the expected sanction when the individual 
violates the rule is (1-Pa)F, while the expected sanction when the individual satisfies the rule 
is PcF.  The incentive to satisfy the rule depends on the difference in expected sanctions (1-
Pa-Pc)F.  This expression shows that false convictions as well as false acquittals reduce the 
incentives to comply with the rule.  The intuition of this reasoning can be illustrated with an 
extreme example.  Suppose that the police stop and ticket for speeding randomly, rather than 
according to the driver’s speed.  In this scenario, there is no incentive to slow down because 
Pa=Pc=1/2.  A driver might as well exceed the speed limit and reach the destination more 
quickly.  Lando also discusses the certain limitations to this under-deterrence result. See 
generally Warren F. Schwartz, Legal Error, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW AND ECONOMICS 
1029–1040 (Boudewijn Bouchaert & Gerrit De Geest eds., 2000). 
 61. See generally John E. Calfee & Richard Craswell, Some Effects of Uncertainty on 
Compliance with Legal Standards, 70 VA. L. REV. 965 (1984).  In contrast, even if the 
likelihood of detection and conviction (and so the expected sanction) is low, a large increase 
in the likelihood of detection and conviction for marginally more aggressive behavior around 
the legal line will tend to lead to substantial deterrence, perhaps even over-deterrence.   
 62. Treble damages are often justified on the grounds that the illegal conduct (e.g., 
covert price fixing conspiracies) is often undetected.  However, the same analysis would 
apply to any reason why illegal behavior would not be penalized, including erroneous 
acquittals.  In fact, this analysis implies the ironic result that punitive damages make more 
sense for the “difficult” cases, where errors are more likely, in contrast to “egregious” cases 
that are easy to detect and lead to certain conviction. A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, 
Punitive Damages:  An Economic Analysis, 111 HARV. L. REV. 869, 891 (1998); Steven C. 
Salop & Lawrence White, Economic Analysis of Private Antitrust Litigation, 74 GEO. L.J. 
1001, 1031 (1986).  
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Anti-deterrence effects also would be greatly reduced.  The three rules of 
thumb can be summarized as follows: 
One, the agencies should commit to clear all mergers that are welfare 
enhancing as proposed, even if it would be possible to extract a beneficial 
settlement. 
Two, the agencies should commit never to accept welfare-reducing 
settlements, even if there is risk of a false acquittal. 
Three, the agencies should commit to always demand settlements for 
welfare-reducing merger proposals that lead to significant welfare 
increases, not simply welfare neutrality. 
These rules of thumb follow directly from the basic deterrence analysis.  
By forgoing tribute settlements for welfare-enhancing proposals, while 
demanding strong settlements (i.e., settlements that go beyond the welfare-
neutral outcome) for welfare-reducing proposals, the policy increases the 
disincentive for the firms to make merger-reducing proposals.  This 
additional wedge is needed because of the adverse effects on deterrence of 
false acquittals by the courts.  This policy notably rejects the view that the 
agency should only attempt to achieve welfare neutrality.  While this policy 
might be controversial as a political matter, it does serve the fundamental 
deterrence goals of antitrust.63  Demanding only welfare-neutral settlements 
would lead to under-deterrence.  At the same time, the agency should not 
demand “tribute” settlements for mergers that are welfare enhancing as 
proposed, even if the merging firms would accept such settlements because 
of litigation costs and delay risks.64   
Determining the exact magnitude of the required welfare increase for 
settlements of welfare-reducing merger proposals requires further analysis, 
though it is clear that welfare neutrality is too accommodative a standard.  It 
is also clear that more harmful merger proposals demand more beneficial 
settlements.  This standard is necessary to maintain the incentives of 
potential merging firms to select less harmful merger proposals or 
voluntarily restructure their proposals in beneficial ways.  However, 
without knowing more about the distribution of mergers and their effects on 
welfare, profits, and other relevant factors, it is difficult to draw more 
specific conclusions. 
B.  Maintaining Discipline 
Following these rules of thumb for optimal deterrence strategy requires 
discipline, that is, a commitment not to deviate from these settlement 
policies.  Discipline is needed because deviation from the long-run optimal 
decision and reversion to the short-run optimal settlement demand would be 
in the agency’s short-run interest.  For example, after a merger is proposed, 
if the agency myopically ignores the inevitable effects on deterrence, the 
 
 63. An understanding of the deterrence benefits also might make the policy less 
politically controversial. 
 64. Subject to the caveats discussed in Part II.B and below. 
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agency might have the incentive to settle for a weaker, welfare reducing 
settlement for a harmful merger that involves a significant risk of a false 
acquittal.  It also might have the incentive to use its bargaining power to 
extract a small divestiture for a welfare-enhancing merger. 
This guidance can be stated as a rule of thumb.  The optimal deterrence 
strategy does not permit the agency to be “gun shy” about going to court.  
This is the case even if the short-run welfare effects from settling would 
seem favorable, once a litigation discount is subtracted to account for the 
litigation risks.  On the other side, the agency also must resist the 
opportunistic incentive to collect settlement “scalps” for welfare-enhancing 
mergers, even if the parties are willing to cave. 
There are several impediments to maintaining such a disciplined policy.  
With respect to welfare-reducing mergers, agencies do not like to lose in 
court, as discussed already.  However, there are good reasons why agencies 
should be less defensive about losses in court and should not be “gun shy” 
about bringing cases instead of agreeing to welfare-reducing settlements.  
First, any claim that losses in court imply agency overreaching or bad 
judgment certainly should be discounted.  It is well established in the law 
and economics literature on equilibrium case selection bias that the win-loss 
record mainly reflects differences in the litigants’ costs and benefits of 
going to trial. 65  In the simplest situation where the stakes are symmetric, 
only the hardest cases reach adjudication, and the equilibrium win-loss rate 
is 50/50.66  Deviations from 50/50 reflect asymmetries in the stakes or 
unanticipated changes in one side’s (here, more likely the agency’s) 
litigation strategy. 
Agencies also might fear that losses in court would adversely affect 
merger law.67  Merger cases are very fact based, which generally should 
lead to narrow (if any) legal precedents.68  But, more generally, if losses in 
court are harmful, wins are beneficial, and it is not clear why losses would 
have larger long-term effects than wins.69  Moreover, these effects may be 
exacerbated today precisely because so few cases are litigated.  If the 
agencies were to bring more cases, each decision would carry less weight 
 
 65. See Priest & Klein, supra note 2, at 5.  
 66. Id. at 17–20; Salop & White, supra note 62, at 1063.  
 67. At the same time, it is the function of courts to affect the law.  Settlements deal the 
courts out of the process. See Pitofsky, supra note 4.  
 68. The possible exception is the attempt by either side to substitute presumptions for 
facts.  Reliance on presumptions can be a signal of a weak factual case.  But arguing for 
presumptions also can be an explicit agency strategy to create stronger law for greater future 
deterrence. 
 69. Whole Foods provides an interesting example of the way in which judicial opinions 
can be two-edged swords.  The district court inexplicably ignored the CEO’s statements 
about the merger eliminating the fear of price wars. See FTC v. Whole Foods Mkt., Inc., 502 
F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2007).  But, the D.C. Circuit panel then held that the FTC has a 
reduced burden of proof for obtaining a preliminary injunction. See FTC v. Whole Foods 
Mkt., Inc., 548 F.3d 1028, 1041 (D.C. Cir. 2008). 
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and the random effects of different courts—especially outlier courts—might 
tend to wash out. 
The overreaching claim also relies on the false assumption that the 
factual conclusions of the court are generally superior to the conclusions of 
the agency in deciding to bring the case.  This assumption seems unlikely to 
be true.70  A typical judge in the District Court for the District of Columbia 
might hear one merger case every five years, and few obtained antitrust 
experience in the private bar.  In contrast, agency staffs are comprised of 
lawyers and economists trained in competition analysis.  They develop 
extensive experience by working full-time on proposed mergers.  They 
work in teams and argue among themselves, which also should serve to 
reduce the error rate. 
Some might even argue that as a doctrinal matter, courts reach the true 
conclusion of whether the merger is anticompetitive as a matter of 
definition.  However, this argument is fundamentally flawed.  It is a tenet of 
the economic analysis of law that courts face inherently imperfect 
information.71  As emphasized in Supreme Court opinions, generalist courts 
generate false acquittals (i.e., false negatives) and false convictions (i.e., 
false positives).72  One cannot build a logical jurisprudence on the concern 
with false positives/false negatives while simultaneously believing that 
factual disagreements between the agency and the court involve the court 
necessarily being right and the agency necessarily being wrong. 
Discipline also entails the agency forgoing use of its bargaining power to 
extract tribute settlements for welfare-enhancing mergers.  Those 
settlements can be attractive to the agency.  If well designed, such 
settlements can raise welfare.  As discussed above, they also serve the goal 
of deterrence when they target situations where the merging parties propose 
an overly broad acquisition that is not inextricably linked to the overall 
welfare benefits of the merger, or where the parties append anticompetitive 
provisions.73 
Unfortunately, such settlements are potentially subject to overuse or even 
abuse.  They may interfere with deterrence by reducing at the margin the 
incentives to propose welfare-enhancing mergers.  Therefore, it is important 
that such settlements be reined in.  One way to achieve this goal is by 
limiting such settlements solely to situations where the merging parties 
propose an overly broad acquisition (with elements clearly not inextricably 
linked to increasing welfare) or append anticompetitive provisions to an 
otherwise beneficial merger. 
 
 70. As noted earlier, I assume that the agencies generally are more skilled than the 
courts.  
 71. See Isaac Ehrlich & Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of Legal Rulemaking, 
3 J. LEGAL STUD. 257, 278 (1974); see also C. Frederick Beckner III & Steven C. Salop, 
Decision Theory and Antitrust Rules, 67 ANTITRUST L.J. 41, 43 (1999). 
 72. See, e.g., Verizon Commc’ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis v. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 
398, 414 (2004). 
 73. See supra Part I.B. 
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The latter condition (“append anticompetitive provisions”) represents 
both a bright line and involves an indefensible addition to the merger 
agreement.  Thus, it is easy to justify and enforce, without a significant 
potential for reducing deterrence.  In contrast, the former condition (“overly 
broad acquisition”) is not as bright a line and so it could be subject to 
misuse.  Thus, its usage must be carefully monitored.  This also 
demonstrates the benefits of the “just say no” bright-line rule as a policy to 
maintain effective discipline. 
C.  Maintaining Discipline with the “Just Say No” Enforcement Policy 
Discipline can also be maintained by making clear commitments to these 
principles and rules of thumb.  Commitments might be made in 
pronouncements like the Merger Guidelines.  However, these do not 
achieve airtight commitments because the Merger Guidelines do not 
represent unbreakable vows.  It also can be difficult for outsiders to detect 
deviations from the Guidelines because the analysis is so fact based.  In the 
end, the agencies must rely on the establishment of a reputation. 
One path to an effective reputation is to adopt a simple and 
straightforward policy.  Simplicity aids transparency, which speeds the 
establishment of the agency reputation.  It also deters backsliding because 
deviation from a simple policy can be easily and rapidly detected.74  Thus, 
even if a more complex policy might have certain advantages, sacrificing 
those advantages for simplicity can be a useful trade off. 
This approach can be applied to merger enforcement policy.  In the 
analysis of short-run incentives, we noted that it was not optimal for the 
agency to commit to a no-settlement policy.  In contrast, once deterrence 
concerns and the benefits of transparency are taken into account, there can 
be benefits from a no-settlement commitment.  The policy would function 
as follows.  On the one hand, if the merger is welfare enhancing or welfare 
neutral, the agency would clear the merger as proposed.  On the other hand, 
if the merger is welfare reducing, the agency would “just say no” and file a 
complaint.  It would not negotiate or demand a fix.  Applying the analogy 
of just “calling balls and strikes,” a baseball umpire never negotiates. 
Commitment to a “just say no” policy would achieve the greatest 
deterrence.  It also would address and reduce the concerns of Frankel,75 
Sims and McFalls,76 and Melamed.77  The policy would prevent the agency 
from exacting tribute settlements on welfare-enhancing proposed mergers, 
as desired by Sims and McFalls.78  The “just say no” feature of the policy 
 
 74. One of the benefits of the classic tit-for-tat strategy in a repeated prisoner’s dilemma 
game is its transparency. See ROBERT AXELROD, THE EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION 51–54 
(1984). 
 75. See Frankel, supra note 8. 
 76. See Sims & McFalls, supra note 5. 
 77. See Melamed, supra note 1. 
 78. See Sims & McFalls, supra note 5.  
 2674 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 81 
would eliminate the current regulatory approach, as desired by Melamed.79  
If the agency were forced to “put up or shut up,” agency overreaching 
would be deterred, and merging firms also would have to “put up or shut 
up.”  This would give the firms the incentive to restructure transactions 
unilaterally, as desired by Frankel.80 
This more aggressive approach might lead to more cases being litigated 
in the short run while the expectations of the merging parties are 
adjusting.81  Litigation costs would increase, but with large offsetting 
benefits.  An increase in litigation would also reduce the seeming 
importance of each individual litigated case.  As noted already, in today’s 
environment, in which merger litigation is a rare event, the outcome of each 
case is overinterpreted as a major signal of enforcement policy and legal 
doctrine.  If more cases were litigated, an outlier court would have less 
effect.  With more cases, the law of large numbers would begin to come 
into play and establish real trends, if any.  It is also possible that as courts 
gain more experience, they might be more inclined to decide each case on 
the basis of its particular facts, rather than simply creating legal 
presumptions.  Or, there might be dueling presumptions by different courts 
that would lead to the law advancing. 
D. Providing a Role for Balance 
This is not to say that there are no benefits to settlements, even 
occasional settlements that lead to welfare-reducing outcomes.  The concern 
is whether agency discipline can be maintained without a just-say-no policy 
commitment.  The overarching concern is that the focus on settlements can 
swallow up the enforcement process in highly counterproductive ways.  A 
focus on settlement implicitly or explicitly encourages agency staff to focus 
on the remedy and potential risks in court, rather than on the competitive 
impact of the merger.  One might frame the point as follows:  the first 
question that the staff should ask is whether the merger as proposed is 
welfare reducing, not what divestitures might improve the outcome.  The 
just-say-no policy is a way to change the focus. 
Settlements nonetheless can retain a residual policy role even if “just say 
no” becomes the norm.  Settlements—even welfare-reducing settlements—
 
 79. See Melamed, supra note 1. 
 80. See Frankel, supra note 8.  
 81. Moving to the “just say no” policy could raise a practical concern that the agency 
may not have sufficient capacity to litigate substantially more merger cases.  In my view, 
this concern is likely a red herring for several reasons.  First, any such capacity limitations 
would be transitory.  If the agency decided to litigate more cases, it could recruit and train 
additional litigators.  Well-qualified attorneys would flock to the agency for the opportunity 
to litigate merger cases.  Second, in the longer run, litigation frequency would reequilibrate 
at a lower level.  Once the agency reputation is established, merging firms would propose 
fewer anticompetitive mergers and would restructure others in advance in order to avoid 
litigation.  To make a simple analogy, a policy of refusing to negotiate with terrorists who 
take hostages deters hostage taking. 
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can be used to establish an agency foothold in an area.82  One recent 
example (albeit in a litigated case) is the FTC’s order in the already-
consummated Evanston Northwestern/ENH merger.83  This case might be 
viewed as a classic pyrrhic victory.84  The order did not entail a divestiture 
but rather consisted of a likely ineffective order mandating that two 
divisions of a single firm begin to compete.  However, the policy benefit of 
the case was to show how such a merger could raise prices, an important 
finding in light of the string of previous agency losses in hospital merger 
cases.  At the same time, a settlement like this is easy to distinguish from 
backsliding to a short-run strategy. 
E.  Encouraging Self-Identification, Disclosure, and Voluntary Remediation 
Deterrence also could be increased by an “advance self-fix” policy to 
encourage self-identification and early disclosure of competitive problems 
and voluntary divestiture proposals by the merging parties.  
Notwithstanding the general bargaining advantages gained by making 
nonnegotiable settlement demands, there can be benefits from ceding the 
role to the merging firms in this particular limited way. 
Current practice requires the agency to identify the competitive problems 
rather than encouraging voluntary disclosure by the parties.  The merging 
parties can simply wait and see if the agency detects the problem.  If and 
when a problem is detected, the parties then can propose a divestiture and 
make a binding agreement with the divestiture buyer.  This process reduces 
deterrence.  In addition, under cases like Arch Coal, the parties can use a 
voluntary divestiture agreement as the competitive benchmark in the event 
that the agency rejects the divestiture and litigates the case in court.85  This 
voluntary divestiture might be made even after the complaint has been filed.  
This procedural stance essentially eliminates the ability of the agency to 
make nonnegotiable settlement demands, which in turn reduces the 
bargaining power of the agency.  Thus, this procedure also reduces 
deterrence. 
 
 82. See Pitofsky, supra note 4. 
 83. In re Evanston Nw. Healthcare Corp., No. 9315, 2007 WL 4358355 (F.T.C. Nov. 9, 
2007). 
 84. See generally Kenneth G. Elzinga, The Antimerger Law:  Pyrrhic Victories?, 12 J.L. 
& ECON. 43 (1969). 
 85. In Arch Coal, the court concluded that Arch’s sale of one mine (Buckskin) to a 
divestiture buyer (Kiewit) “would be considered as part of the challenged transactions” along 
with Arch’s acquisition in evaluating “the probable effect of those transactions on 
competition.” FTC v. Arch Coal, Inc., 329 F. Supp. 2d 109, 114–15 n.2 (D.D.C. 2004).  
Other courts have also treated the remedy as part of the transaction to be evaluated, although 
there is still an open issue about which side has the burden of proof on remedy.  Other recent 
cases that raised this issue include United States v. Dairy Farmers of America, 426 F.3d 850 
(6th Cir. 2005), and FTC v. CCC Holdings, 605 F. Supp. 2d 26 (D.D.C. 2009); see also 
Darren S. Tucker, The Elephant in the Room:  Litigating the Fix After Arch Coal and Dairy 
Farmers, ANTITRUST SOURCE (Jan. 2006), http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/
publishing/antitrust_source/Jan06_FullSource1_27.authcheckdam.pdf. 
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An alternative approach would entitle the merging firms to have the 
voluntary divestiture treated as part of the merger transaction for the 
purpose of competitive-effects analysis, but only if the divestiture 
agreement is made well before the complaint is issued.  The required timing 
could be either as part of the initial HSR filing, during Phase 1 of the HSR 
process, or before second request compliance is certified.  This timing shift 
would incentivize the merging parties to identify, disclose, and cure the 
competitive problem in advance.  It thus would increase deterrence.  One 
might refer to this as a credible “advance self-fix” policy, in contrast to the 
current misnamed “fix-it-first” policy.86  This advance self-fix policy 
requires adjustment of the current Arch Coal approach of allowing after-
the-fact voluntary divestiture agreements to be made part of the transaction 
for purposes of evaluating competitive effects. 
CONCLUSION 
This Article has analyzed agency merger settlement demands under two 
alternative policy assumptions:  a short-run optimal policy that focuses only 
on the merger under investigation without regard to future deterrence versus 
a superior long-run optimal policy that takes deterrence benefits into 
account.  The criticisms of agency decisions suggest a current agency 
approach something along the lines of the short-run policy.  The principles 
and rules of thumb for long-run deterrence developed here would involve a 
notable shift in policy. 
This Article also suggests further analysis.  Much of the analysis in this 
Article has assumed that the agencies can and do make nonnegotiable 
settlement demands, backed by a commitment to litigate if the demands are 
not accepted by the merging firms.  This is not the typical agency 
bargaining dynamic today.  While certain agency bargaining advantages 
flow from such a committed strategy, we have also noted certain 
shortcomings of this strategy.  Negotiations can reveal important 
information that can lead to higher welfare.87  It is possible that these 
informational benefits may mitigate or trump the benefits to the agency 
committing to a single nonnegotiable offer.  Therefore, further analysis of 
alternative negotiation strategies would be a useful extension. 
This Article also suggests that deterrence may be compromised by 
permitting the merging parties to make last-minute divestiture agreements 
 
 86. This advance self-fix proposal is thus very different from the agency “fix it first” 
policy in that fix-it-first remedies can be proposed at the end of the HSR process but before a 
complaint is filed. U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, ANTITRUST DIVISION POLICY GUIDE TO MERGER 
REMEDIES 22 (2011), available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/guidelines/272350.pdf. 
 87. This Article implicitly assumes that the agency does not make its settlement demand 
until all the relevant information has been revealed.  However, to the extent that both sides 
became more (rather than less) open during settlement negotiations, such openness could 
lead to benefits from a negotiation strategy rather than a commitment strategy.  Discovery 
during the pretrial phase of litigation could also disclose additional information that might 
lead to productive settlement discussions.  These issues are worthy of additional study. 
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that are treated by the court as part of the merger agreement for the purpose 
of evaluating competitive effects.  At the same time, consistent with the 
suggested approach in this Article, it has become more common for merger 
agreements to commit the acquiring firm to certain potential divestitures.  It 
would be useful to evaluate these merger agreements in more detail and 
analyze the effects of such agreements in settlement negotiations and their 
impact on deterrence. 
Finally, the analysis of the long-run optimal policy has focused on 
several policy rules of thumb, rather than examining alternative policies in 
the context of a formal economic model.  While it is unlikely that a single 
model would capture all the complexity involved in merger-settlement 
policy, developing formal models no doubt would push our understanding 
forward.  Therefore, additional formal modeling efforts also would be 
useful. 
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APPENDIX:  FORMAL MODEL OF SHORT-RUN 
OPTIMAL SETTLEMENT DEMANDS 
To better expose the logic of the analysis, it is useful to formulate a 
technical model of agency behavior.  Embedding the analysis in a technical 
model also permits the derivation of certain key properties of the short-run 
optimal settlement strategy. 
A merger can be characterized as having a set of structural and market 
characteristics that determine the expected impact of the merger on the net 
present value (NPV) of economic welfare (whether consumer welfare or 
aggregate welfare) and profits of the merging parties.  One key 
characteristic is the set of assets comprising the transaction.  Other 
characteristics include all the usual market structure factors commonly 
investigated in merger analysis—market shares and concentration; ease of 
entry; diversion ratios; margins; GUPPIs; elasticity of demand; expansion 
and repositioning; buyer power, synergies, factors that facilitate or 
complicate coordination, etc.88 
A merger proposal can be characterized by its set of structural and 
behavioral characteristics.  For simplicity, we assume that there is a single 
scalar characteristic y, and the specific merger is characterized by y=ŷ and 
NPVs of incremental expected welfare and profits, denoted by W(y) and 
П(y), respectively.  We assume that all three participants (the agency, the 
firms, and the court) face imperfect information about welfare and that the 
agency has unbiased estimates of expected welfare.  Incremental welfare 
and profits can be affected by a settlement (e.g., a divestiture or other 
changes that leads to a new structure S < ŷ).  We focus on divestitures and 
other remedies that raise welfare but reduce profits. 
The left panel, Figure 1A, illustrates a merger as proposed with structure 
ŷ and negative expected incremental welfare W(ŷ).  The right panel, Figure 
1B, shows the incremental profits П(ŷ).  Figure 1 illustrates the relationship 
between incremental welfare and profits for various alternative settlement 
structures.  If the agency demands a settlement S such that П(S)<0, then the 
firm would abandon the transaction rather than accept the settlement.  If the 
proposed merger is abandoned or enjoined, which we formalize as y=0, 
then the incremental welfare and profit would equal zero. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 88. Certain merger characteristics affect welfare and profits in the same direction.  For 
example, synergies increase both the incremental profitability and welfare.  However, other 
factors affect welfare and profits in opposite directions.  For example, high barriers to entry 
would likely lead to higher profits and lower welfare, other variables held constant.  Some 
factors might move welfare and profits in the same direction in one region but in opposite 
directions in other regions. 
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Figure 1 
We focus on settlements between M and ŷ that achieve higher welfare, 
W(S)>W(ŷ), but lower profits, П(S)<П(ŷ).  As illustrated in Figure 1A, 
there is a settlement structure that leads to welfare neutrality, which we 
denote as S=N.  There is another settlement, S=M, that maximizes 
welfare.89 
We assume that a court will reject a proposed merger if and only if it 
concludes that the expectation is that the merger will be welfare reducing, 
relative to the no-merger alternative.  We assume that the court is less 
informed and less expert than the agency, so there is some probability that it 
will reach an erroneous outcome.  We denote with p(y) the probability that 
the court permits a merger with structure y.  We assume that the court is 
less likely to falsely acquit if the welfare harms are larger, that is, p’(y)<0.  
For simplicity, we assume that the agency and the merging parties agree 
about the probability of the outcome in court. 
In order to estimate the likelihood that its settlement demand would be 
accepted by the merging firms, the agency forms expectations about the 
firms’ incremental profitability of the merger and their litigation and delay 
costs, including delay risks.  This might be formalized as follows:  the firms 
would accept a settlement demand S that would lead to profits П(S) that 
exceed the firm’s expected profits from litigating, or 
 
(1)  П(S) > (1 – γ)[p(ŷ)П(ŷ) – CF]  
 
where CF is the merging firms’ out-of-pocket litigation cost, γ is the 
probability that the delay will cause the transaction to be terminated by the 
parties, and p(ŷ) is the probability that the firm wins in court.  Equation (1) 
 
 89. If the settlement involves a divestiture that moves the structure of the merger below 
M, both incremental welfare and incremental profits fall, so such settlements would never be 
proposed. 
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assumes for simplicity that the litigation costs are only borne if the deal is 
not terminated, though it is likely that in reality there would be some 
litigation costs before the deal is terminated. 
If the agency had perfect information about equation (1), it could tailor 
the maximum settlement demand that the merging firms would accept.90  
However, we assume that the agency generally has imperfect information 
about the firms’ profitability.91  For purposes of the economic model, we 
assume that the agency forms an estimate a(S) that the firm will accept a 
settlement demand S.  We assume that a weaker settlement offer is more 
likely to be accepted by the parties (i.e., a’(S)>0). 
We assume that the agency makes a nonnegotiable, “take it or leave it” 
settlement demand, backed up by a commitment to litigate if its demand is 
rejected by the firms.  The settlement demand S can range at one end from 
de minimis demand (S~ŷ) that barely (if at all) affects the welfare impact, 
up to a large change (S=M) that would lead to welfare being maximized.  
An agency’s absolute decision to litigate is equivalent to making a 
settlement demand so large that the merging firms would surely choose to 
reject. 
The agency chooses the settlement demand S* to maximize expected 
welfare EW, that is,  
 
(2) Max EW = a(S)W(S) + (1 – a(S))(1 – γ)[p(ŷ)W(ŷ) – C]  
                        S 
 
where W(S) is the agency’s estimate of the expected welfare outcome if the 
settlement is accepted, W(ŷ) is the agency’s estimate of expected welfare if 
the settlement is rejected and the agency loses in court, a(S) is the agency’s 
estimate of the likelihood that the settlement is rejected by the merging 
parties, p(ŷ) is the probability that the agency loses in court, γ is the 
probability that the deal is terminated voluntarily as the result of the agency 
complaint, and C is the agency’s opportunity cost of litigation.92 
This model assumes that the agency commits to litigating if its settlement 
demand is rejected.  The agency does not bluff.  While equation (2) 
describes the short-run optimal policy that takes the structure of the merger 
 
 90. This Article does not focus on the use of settlement demands to reveal asymmetric 
information.  Instead, it simply focuses on the parties that have differential beliefs as a result 
of limited information on both sides.  It also does not analyze the structure of the imperfect 
information, at least initially.  Instead, it makes assumptions about the impact of the 
imperfect information on the parties’ subjective probabilities of the court’s decision on 
liability and the likelihood that the other party will accept a settlement offer rather than 
litigate. 
 91. Perhaps the most significant missing information is the delay risk factor γ, the 
probability that the litigation delay will cause the deal to crater. 
 92. For simplicity, this Article assumes that the agency anticipates a zero probability that 
the merger proposal will be abandoned rather than litigated, a condition that is satisfied if  
П(M) > 0. 
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as given and ignores deterrence effects, the agency’s policies will have 
effects on the structure of future proposed mergers. 
With imperfect information and positive litigation costs, the agency’s 
short-run optimal settlement demand balances the benefits and costs of 
making a marginally tougher settlement demand.  The first-order condition 
can be stated formally as follows: 
 
W(S*) – (1 – γ)[p(ŷ)W(ŷ) – C] = –aW’(S*)/a’            (3) 
 
Intuitively, the agency has the incentive to choose the settlement demand 
that equates the marginal benefit to the marginal cost.  This tradeoff can be 
stated in the form of a marginal risk-reward ratio.  The term on the right-
hand side reflects the marginal risk-reward tradeoff.  The reward is the 
marginal increase in expected welfare, –aW’(S).  The risk is the marginal 
reduction in the likelihood that the settlement will be accepted, a’(S).  The 
larger the ratio of marginal reward to marginal risk, the more the agency’s 
incentive will be to demand a more aggressive settlement commitment. 
Equation (3) also explains why the agency may take a less aggressive 
position toward more anticompetitive mergers, that is, those with more 
negative W(ŷ).  While the likelihood of a false acquittal, p(ŷ), will be lower 
for such mergers, the expected welfare harm, p(ŷ)W(ŷ)<0, may become 
more negative.  In this situation, the agency would have more to fear from 
an aggressive settlement demand.  As a result, the agency would have the 
incentive to be more accommodating by demanding a weaker settlement, 
S*. 
